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Rawani and Balgamwalla: International Legal Updates

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL UPDATES
ASIA
ARRESTS AND HARASSMENT OF
MONTAGNARD CHRISTIANS IN
VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA
On January 1, 2005, Cambodian
National Police Chief Hok Lundy closed
Cambodia’s northeastern border in the
Ratanakiri province to block the entry of
Vietnamese Montagnard Christian asylumseekers. The Montagnard Christians are in
conflict with the Vietnamese government
over issues of religious freedom and the loss
of their ancestral lands, much of which were
taken over by settlers after the Montagnard
Christians moved away. The government has
also confiscated some land to make way for
industrial activities, such as state coffee and
rubber plantations.
In December 2004, Vietnamese security
forces arrested and detained dozens of
Montagnard Christians during protests
without any arrest warrants or formal
charges. Montagnard activists maintain that
the protests were peaceful and their purpose
was to uphold religious freedom. Police also
arrested Montagnard church leaders for
organizing Christmas gatherings in the villages. At the same time that Vietnamese
security forces have increased the number of
arrests of Montagnard Christians, Cambodia
has blocked the passage of Montagnards
seeking refuge across the border. Cambodian
officials arrested Montagnard Christians
who crossed the border and sent them back
to Vietnam. As a result, increasing numbers
of Vietnamese Montagnard Christians risk
arrest and prosecution at home.
Moreover, even when Montagnard
Christians voluntarily returned to Vietnam
from Cambodia, Vietnamese authorities
treated them with suspicion. The returnees
were placed under police surveillance and
often summoned to police stations for
questioning about their activities. In
December, Vietnamese officials accused
several Montagnard Christians returning
from a Cambodian refugee camp of being
spies for the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and sent them back to Cambodia.

southwest Tibet to China’s northeastern border with North Korea.

Cambodia is party to the United Nations
Refugee Convention, which prohibits the
return of individuals facing a well-founded
fear of persecution on political, religious, or
ethnic grounds. Under this Convention,
Cambodia has an obligation to make individual determinations about the validity of
asylum claims, rather than blocking groups
as a whole, as they have done in this situation. In addition, Cambodia is a State Party
to the Convention Against Torture, which
states in Article 3 that “no State Party shall
expel, return or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.” By closing its border to
Montagnard Christians, Cambodia has failed
to follow its treaty obligations.

The State Environmental Protection
Administration reported on its website that
many of the halted projects began
construction without the necessary environmental impact assessments and other
required authorizations. The Administration
spokesperson stated that some of the projects
may be allowed to resume with proper
permits, but that others would be cancelled.

In response to this crisis, Vietnamese
Prime Minister Pham Van Khai issued a decision in July 2004 in which he pledged to provide each low-income minority household in
the Central Highlands with at least 200
square meters of housing land. In August
2004, the government also announced that it
would immediately suspend governmentsponsored migration of lowlanders to the
Central Highlands and would put an end to
spontaneous migration to the region by 2010.

CHINA’S SUSPENSION OF
POWER PROJECTS
In January 2005, the Chinese government ordered the halt of 30 large construction projects, including two at the controversial Three Gorges Dam, reportedly because
of violations of environmental protections
and other regulatory concerns. Twenty-six of
the construction projects were power plants
planned in 12 different provinces in China.
This order was unexpected because China
suffered significant blackouts and electricity
shortages last year and has been eager to
increase its energy-generating capacity. Other
halted projects include a cardboard factory, a
petrochemicals plant, and construction of a
section of a highway meant to stretch from
28

Last year, the government announced
that it would increase control over investment in power plants because many were
being launched without legal authorization.
It was estimated that the capacity of unauthorized power plants under construction
was 120,000 megawatts. The biggest single
energy project halted was the Xiluodu Dam
project, which was designed to produce
12,600 megawatts of energy. The second
and third biggest projects halted were segments of the Three Gorges Dam and were
designed to produce 4200 megawatts and
100 megawatts of energy.
The Three Gorges Dam has been very
controversial in China, and many environmental groups and human rights activists
have criticized the project. The Dam, the
world’s largest hydroelectric project, would
be one-and-a-half miles wide and more than
600 feet high and would create a reservoir
hundreds of feet deep and nearly 400 miles
long. Dam supporters argue the Dam will
prevent the catastrophic flooding of the
Yangtze River and provide much needed
electricity. Additionally, China’s growing
coal consumption for electrical power poses
a threat to the environment, and the Dam
would reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide
and carbon dioxide by generating electricity
equal to about 40 million tons of coal.
Dam critics argue that the project is not
worth displacing the more than 600,000
people who have been forced to leave their
towns and villages to make room for the
reservoir. Many poor residents have been left
homeless by the relocation, and corruption
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and inefficiency in project management
have left many residents without their promised compensation. In all, the reservoir will
engulf two cities, 11 counties, 140 towns,
326 townships, and 1,351 villages.
Furthermore, environmental groups
claim that the project will result in significant environmental damage. The Dam will
sever the flow of the Yangtze River, which
will cause pollution from industrial and residential sources to concentrate in the river.
This will result in an accumulation of toxic
material and potential pollutants in the
reservoir, which would create health hazards
and threaten the river’s wildlife, including
several endangered species.

MIDDLE EAST
MOROCCO
In December 2004, the first in a series of
public hearings for victims of human rights
abuses opened in Rabat, Morocco. The hearings–expected to include 200 testimonials
from Moroccans in ten cities over the course
of ten weeks–are a government initiative to
investigate human rights violations that
occurred in the 43 years between Morocco’s
independence and the present regime, from
1956 to 1999.
King Mohammad VI established the
Equity and Reconciliation Commission
(IER) in January 2004 to organize the hearings and selected some of the country’s
most respected figures in human rights to
serve on the Commission. The IER’s purpose, according to the Moroccan report on
compliance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is
to “close definitively the file of human
rights abuses committed in the past.”
Commission members traveled around the
country and conducted interviews with
civil society representatives and citizens
regarding measures for social assistance and
rehabilitation. The IER will oversee the
return of victims’ bodies to their families,
the payment of monetary reparations for
past human rights abuses, and the creation
of public memorials to honor victims.
To assess the 20,000 claims submitted
for consideration, the Commission selected
a diverse group of witnesses to testify in the
hearings based on their age, gender, region
of origin, circumstances surrounding their

arrest and detention, and the nature of their
rights violations. The IER also plans to
organize 12 thematic hearings to initiate
public debate regarding the legal, historical,
and political context surrounding the
human rights violations.
The hearing opened on December 21
with the testimony of Chari El Hou. El Hou,
a French teacher, was arrested in 1973 for
belonging to the national union of teachers
and the left-wing National Union of Popular
Forces. Five of El Hou’s 13 fellow prisoners
died as the result of harsh conditions in the
secret detention center where they were held
for 11 months. Subsequent testimonials over
the course of the hearing described kidnapping, torture, and forced exile. Witnesses
delivered their testimonies in the language of
their choosing, subject to 20-minute time
limits. The Commission permitted the company of friends and family members to lend
moral support. Radio and television stations
broadcasted the hearings live.
At an Institute of Amazigh Culture colloquium entitled “Hearings and Oral History,”
IER chairman Driss Benzekri stated that the
hearings are different from those held in
Ghana and South Africa. Benzekri explained
that the Commission hearings are intended
as a vehicle for people to voice their emotions
and relate their experiences, rather than to
serve as formal trials. “We need not only to
study some individual cases of human rights
violations,” he said, “but also fathom truth in
its collective dimension by placing these
events in their cultural, social and political
dimensions in order to contribute to drafting
genuine policies of change.”
The Commission’s activities enjoy wide
support from human rights organizations
across the Middle East and North Africa.
Moroccan political parties and the local
press have also welcomed the public hearings; however, the Moroccan Association on
Human Rights (AMDH), the leading independent human rights organization in the
country, remains critical of the hearing’s
structure. While witnesses are “free to express themselves,” they are prohibited from
naming their torturers and others responsible for committing human rights abuses.
Abdelhamid Amine, head of AMDH, argues
that these rules protect guilty parties, a number of whom still hold government positions. Public officials are also not required to
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testify before the Commission or to furnish
testimonies to aid investigations. Furthermore, the Commission is not prepared to
guarantee the right for accused parties to defend themselves, which would be required in
the event that the Commission allowed witnesses to identify their torturers. Benzekri
has responded to these criticisms by stating
that, in most cases, the witnesses lack cogent
evidence to support their claims.
The tribunal does not include testimonies regarding human rights abuses committed after 1999 under the rule of King
Mohammad IV. The current regime has garnered criticism from human rights groups
for counter-terrorism laws that violate
human rights norms.
Full testimonies from the IER hearings
are available in French and Arabic on the
Commission’s website: http://www.ier.ma/.

IRAN
On January 1, 2005, one month after
their release from prison, reformist journalists Omid Memarian and Ruzbeh MirEbrahimi testified to the Article 90
Commission–a parliamentary, constitutionally-mandated body established to hear individual claims against the government–that
they were tortured during their three-month
detention. After the testimonies were made
public, Tehran chief prosecutor Judge Saeed
Mortazavi denied the journalists’ allegations.
In a press conference on January 3, he
announced that the state would indict
Memarian and Mir-Ebrahimi, as well as
other journalists who testified to the commission, for their “politically motivated”
accusations. Human Rights Watch reports
that Mortazavi’s operatives subsequently
made harassing phone calls to the journalists
and threatened them with death.
Memarian and Mir-Ebrahimi are among
the 20 opposition journal and weblog contributors arrested in a government crackdown beginning in September 2004. On
December 7, 2004, the Iranian press published letters written by Memarian, MirEbrahimi, and fellow imprisoned journalists
Javad Qolan Tamimi and Shahram
Rafizadeh. Mir-Ebrahimi was released on
November 26 on a bail of 300 million
Iranian rials ($34,080 USD), while
Memarian and Rafizadeh were released from

Rawani and Balgamwalla: International Legal Updates
jail on December 1 on a bail of 500 million
Iranian rials ($56,800 USD). Human Rights
Watch speculated that the letters were a condition for the prisoners’ release. In the letters,
the journalists confessed to charges of publishing anti-regime propaganda, jeopardizing
national security, disturbing the public, and
insulting religious principles. They also
claimed that they were “brainwashed” into
criticizing the Iranian government.

sentences if they did not testify against
Mazroi. According to Human Rights Watch,
the prisoners were interrogated for eight
hours a day for three consecutive days and
denied access to lawyers. On December 14,
the prisoners testified via televised broadcast
that they were treated “as gently as flowers”
while in detention. Tamimi reported that he
occupied a cell “30 square meters in area,
with a color television.”

In his letter, Tamimi of the daily publication Mardomsalari denounced Ali Mazroi,
head of the Iranian Journalists Association,
for attempting to organize a march on behalf
of the prisoners. He called for criminal
indictment of “those who poison the atmosphere by . . . supporting criminals like me.”
After the letter was published, the director of
Tehran’s Evin prison sent faxes to news agencies indicating that Tamimi also confessed to
supplying a foreign military attaché with
secret documents.

The European Union lodged a protest in
November in response to Iran’s curtailment
of free speech and its practice of detaining
and mistreating journalists. Human Rights
Watch called on Iranian authorities to protect the journalists testifying before the presidential commission and to investigate
Mortazavi’s involvement in the detainment
of journalists.

Mir-Ebrahimi and Rafizadeh reported in
their letters that they were treated humanely
and permitted the company of other prisoners. The Iranian press, however, reported
that the prisoners were placed in solitary
confinement. Human Rights Watch contends that a squadron of former intelligence
officers now employed by the judiciary
extracted these “confession letters” under
duress. The magistrate and interrogator
delivered messages and threats to detainees
on Mortazavi’s behalf. The detainees were
kept at a secret detention center outside of
Tehran.
Human Rights Watch reported that the
detainees were held in small cells and interrogated and tortured for up to 11 hours at a
time. The prisoners were also denied access
to medical care and legal assistance, and
were only permitted occasional family visits.
Interrogators threatened that they would
arrest the prisoners’ families and friends if
the prisoners failed to cooperate.
On December 10, in a public letter to
President Mohammed Khatami, Mazroi
accused the judiciary of participating in the
secret detention and torture of journalists.
Judge Mortazavi, in turn, filed suit against
Mazroi for libel. The following day,
Mortazavi detained former prisoners MirEbrahimi, Memarian, and Rafizadeh, threatening them and Tamimi with lengthy prison

QATAR
On December 27, 2004, Qatar’s parliament announced plans to pass a law banning
the use of child jockeys in the sport of camel
racing. Although the law does not specify a
minimum age, a Qatari cabinet official stated that the bill is intended to apply to children under age 18. The bill, which has been
under revision and consideration for the past
year, arose from criticism regarding the trafficking of children from Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, and Pakistan to serve as jockeys.
Approximately 100 youth, aged nine and
older, race or train as jockeys in Qatar. Some
are motivated by hopes of providing for their
families, with ten percent of the $190,000
USD prize for Qatar’s largest camel race
going to the parent or guardian of the jockey. Jockeys also receive monthly salaries of
up to $400 USD. Human rights groups and
the U.S. State Department report, however,
that children as young as two years old are
sold to or kidnapped by traffickers, then resold and trained for camel racing.
Jockeys face dangerous work conditions.
Employers are known to starve jockeys to
keep them as lightweight as possible. Small
children are at risk of being thrown and
trampled by camels three times their height.
As the jockeys are strapped to the camels,
they may be crushed in the event that the
camel falls. The U.S. State Department
reports that jockeys also suffer from genital
bleeding due to the pressure and friction in
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racing, and many become
jockey is critically injured
race, his employer usually
leaving him without legal
work permit.

impotent. If a
and unable to
abandons him,
residency or a

Qatar is a signatory to the ILO 1999
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention.
Article 3 of the Convention prohibits “all
forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery,” including trafficking, and “work which,
by its nature or the circumstances in which
it is carried out, is likely to harm the health,
safety or morals of children.” Qatar, however, has not signed or ratified the Convention
on the Rights of the Child or the
Convention on Child Labor.
Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Faisal alThani, chief organizer of the Qatari camel
races, approves of the new law that will prohibit the use of child jockeys, which he says
is one of “Qatar’s moves to entrench a culture of human rights.” Sheikh Hamad, however, denies that any South Asians have been
trafficked as jockeys. He maintains that all
jockeys are Sudanese, legal residents of
Qatar, and accompanied by a parent or
guardian.
A Swiss company is developing a new
substitute “robot jockey” that will be finalized later this year. There is hope that this
technological alternative will facilitate the
enforcement of this law, making it more
effective than the largely ignored 1993 ban
in the United Arab Emirates imposing age
and weight restrictions on jockeys. Sheikh
Hamad claims that plans to transition to the
robot jockeys originated within the camelracing industry, not in response to pressure
from human rights groups.
HRB
Swati Rawani, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
Sabrina Balgamwalla, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the Middle East for
the Human Rights Brief.

